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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-3044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
JULIAN SAMUELS, a/k/a Michael Smith,
a/k/a Trigger,
                  Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 03-cr-00503)
District Judge:  The Honorable Berle M. Schiller
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 7, 2005
BEFORE: NYGAARD, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed May 19, 2005)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
2Appellant Julian Samuels pleaded guilty to: (1) possession with intent to distribute
more than five grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B); (2) possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base
within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); (3) possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (4)
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Samuels
conditioned his plea on maintaining his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his
motion to suppress the firearm, bag of narcotics, and money obtained during a police
search.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm.
I.
On July 7, 2002, Philadelphia Police received an anonymous telephone tip
regarding a man with a gun at Arch and Edgewood Streets.  The man was described as a
heavyset, stocky, black male, wearing a blue baseball hat, blue jeans, and a two-toned tan
shirt.  Several officers, including Charles Buck, Rashad Guess, Jermane Bennett, and
Dominic Cole heard a radio call about the report and responded to the area.  The area
surrounding Arch and Edgewood Streets is described as a “high crime area” where many
violent crimes, including a shooting just weeks before, had taken place. When Officers
Buck and Guess got to the scene they saw Samuels.
Samuels was on the steps of a house on the corner with his back toward the
officers.  Samuels matched the description from the call, so Officer Guess asked to speak
3to him.  Samuels kept his back to the officers and did not acknowledge them.  Samuels
then went up the stairs while keeping his back to the officers and continuing to ignore
their attempts to engage him in conversation.
At the hearing before the District Court, the officers testified that Samuels
appeared to be nervous and was looking around while moving only his head and the upper
part of his body.  The officers believed there was something near Samuels’ waist that he
did not want the officers to see.  At some point, Samuels turned and Officer Buck saw
Samuels’ waist for the first time.  He testified that he “noticed a bulge around the waist
area” and believed it could be a gun.  The officers then drew their guns and ordered
Samuels to put his hands up.
Rather than comply, Samuels continued to look around and move his hands.  Three
officers testified that Samuels’ hands were going up and down, and Officer Buck testified
that he was particularly concerned about the location of Samuels’ right hand, which was
near the bulge in his waist.  When Samuels did not comply with the officers’ demand that
he put his hands up, Officers Buck and Guess approached him and grabbed his hands. 
Officer Bennett then removed the “bulge” from Samuels’ waist.  It was, indeed, a gun. 
Samuels was then taken into custody and a search incident to arrest revealed crack
cocaine as well as cash.
In addition to the testimony of Officers Buck, Bennett, and Cole, who were called
as witnesses by the government, a man by the name of Ernest Moss testified as a defense
1  The guideline range was 248–298 months’ imprisonment. 
4
witness.  Moss testified that he was visiting a friend at the house on the corner of Arch
and Edgewood Streets, and a few minutes after Samuels arrived, Officers Buck and Guess
“jumped [out of their car] with their guns out.”  He testified that Samuels raised his hand
and said “I didn’t do anything” at which point he was grabbed, handcuffed, and searched. 
Moss also testified that when the officers searched Samuels he only remembered them
discovering money and keys.  Finally, Moss admitted that he had been previously
convicted of assault, carrying a firearm, and a narcotics offense.
The District Court evaluated the credibility of both the officers and Moss and
found the testimony of the officers to be more credible:  “[A]ccordingly, looking at all of
evidence presented as a whole, I credit the credible and consistent testimony given by
Officers Buck, Bennett and Cole.”  (J.A. at 175).  The District Court then found that the
officers conducted a proper stop based upon reasonable suspicion, and therefore denied
Samuels’ motion to suppress.
Samuels then entered into a conditional guilty plea with the Government.  In this
plea, Samuels and the Government agreed that a term of 248 months’ imprisonment was
an appropriate sentence.   Although not binding on the District Court, it accepted this1
term and sentenced Samuels to 248 months.  Samuels has appealed the District Court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.
5While Samuels’ appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in which the Sentencing
Guidelines were declared to be advisory, rather than mandatory.  Samuels now asks that
we declare his guilty plea invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent.  Essentially,
Samuels argues that, because he erroneously believed the guidelines to be mandatory, he
agreed to the sentence of 248 months; whereas, under a system where the Guidelines are
merely advisory, he would have argued for a lower sentence.
II.
A. Samuels Was Not Seized Until The Officers Physically Restrained Him
The first step in evaluating Samuels’ claims is determining when Samuels was
seized by the officers.  In his brief, Samuels claims that seizure occurred at the time the
officers “positioned themselves at the bottom of the steps of the porch and directed
demands at Appellant, who was walking up the steps with his back to them.” 
(Appellant’s Br. at 15).  This is simply incorrect.  A seizure occurs in one of two
situations: (1) when officers apply physical force to the person being seized, or (2) when
force is absent, where officers make a show of authority and the person seized submits to
the show of police authority.  See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626–28 (1991);
United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 2000).  
A seizure does not occur when an officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).  That is exactly what the officers
6did here.  They approached Samuels and asked to speak with him.  Even if we assume for
the sake of argument that there was a show of authority, Samuels did not submit.  Rather,
Samuels kept his back to the officers, walked away from the officers up the porch steps,
and refused to answer their questions.  He did not comply with the officers’ request to
speak with him, and therefore, he did not submit to the show of authority.  Cf. United
States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that complying even
temporarily with an officer’s orders was sufficient to create a seizure).  
When the officers saw Samuels’ waist and noticed a bulge, they took out their guns
and, at that point, a show of authority existed.  Even then, however, Samuels did not
comply with the officers’ request to put his hands up.  Although it appears Samuels
placed one hand up at one point, he continued to make hand movements toward his waist;
thus, he never submitted to a show of authority.  See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 359
(concluding that even if an individual momentarily complies with a show of authority,
such compliance is not sufficient to effectuate a seizure).  Therefore, it was not until the
officers physically restrained Samuels’ arms that a seizure occurred.  Id. at 358.
B. The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion To Seize Samuels 
At the time the officers physically restrained Samuels, they had reasonable
suspicion sufficient to justify a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Contrary to Samuels’ arguments on appeal, the officers were not relying solely on an
anonymous tip.  Rather, the officers based the decision to seize Samuels on the tip, the
7high crime area, the visible bulge in Samuels waist band, and perhaps most importantly,
Samuels conduct.  Samuels was acting nervous while being questioned by the officers and
when officers demanded that Samuels raise his hands, he continued to make gestures
toward his waist.  An officer may make a Terry stop when “the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that criminal activity may be afoot.”  Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Terry, 329 U.S. at 21–22, 30) (internal quotations omitted).  Here, the
information available to the officers provided such reasonable suspicion.  
Although, under some circumstances Samuels’s actions may have been consistent
with lawful activity, this does not divest the officers of reasonable suspicion.  The officers
provided “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant” the seizure of Samuels.  United States v.
Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10 at 13 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Terry, 329 U.S. at 21). 
C. The Officers Acted Appropriately In Conducting A Limited Search For Weapons
Samuels also challenges the manner in which the officers conducted the search,
which revealed the firearm.  After restraining Samuels arms, Officer Bennett lifted
Samuels’ shirt and reached for the area where he had seen the bulge that appeared to be a
gun.  He then removed a gun.  Samuels claims that Terry only authorizes police to
conduct a frisk or pat-down of an individual’s outer clothing and then, upon finding a
readily identifiable weapon, police may extend the search into pockets.  Thus, Samuels
8objects because, rather than conducting a full pat-down of his entire body, police went
directly to the suspicious area and removed the gun.
When making a Terry stop, an officer is permitted to make a limited protective
search for concealed weapons when the individual gives the officer reason to believe he
or she may be armed and dangerous.  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).  This
search must be limited in scope to its protective purpose.  Id.  Here, the officers
conducted a limited intrusion designed to address their immediate concerns regarding a
possible threat to their safety.  This case is nearly identical to Adams, in which the
Supreme Court upheld an officer’s conduct when he reached into a car and removed a
gun from an individual’s waistband.  In both cases, the officer did not conduct a pat-
down; rather, the officer conducted a more limited search by going directly to the area
where the officer knew the weapon was most likely to be.  Accordingly, the officers in
this case acted within the bounds of Terry by conducting a search limited in scope to that
necessary to secure their safety.  Id.  Thus, the gun was legally discovered and the District
Court did not err in denying Samuels’ motion to suppress. 
III.
Finally, we turn to Samuels’ argument that his guilty plea was invalid because it
was not knowing and intelligent.  A plea that is knowing and intelligent at the time it is
entered is not rendered invalid because of a subsequent change in the law.  Untied States
v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).  Samuels knowingly and intelligently waived his
9right to appeal his sentence when he entered his guilty plea.  Therefore, he cannot now
attempt to take advantage of the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker.  United States v.
Lockett, No. 04-2244, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7784, at *17 (3d Cir. May 5, 2005). 
Accordingly, Samuels sentence is affirmed.
